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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 09-3053
                           
DB ENTERPRISE DEVELOPERS & BUILDERS, INC, 
                                     Appellant
v.
NICHOLAS A. MICOZZIE, in his individual capacity; 
THOMAS MICOZZIE, in his individual capacity; 
UPPER DARBY TOWNSHIP
                          
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-05076)
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell
                           
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 14, 2010
                           
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: September 17, 2010)
                           
OPINION
                           
BARRY, Circuit Judge
D.B. Enterprise Developers & Builders, Inc. (“DB”) appeals from the judgment of
       Given the parties’ familiarity with this case, we set out the facts in summary fashion,1
accepting “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and view[ing] them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Carino v. Stefan, 376 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2004).
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the District Court dismissing its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.  DB alleges that defendants
forced it to undertake expensive sewer construction on public roadways by threatening to
disrupt DB’s development of a private parcel of land if it failed to do so.  We will affirm.  
BACKGROUND1
In 2004, DB sought to develop for residential use a parcel of land adjacent to
Bishop Avenue in Springfield, Pennsylvania known as Springfield Knoll.  Bishop Avenue
also borders Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, and DB claims that Upper Darby, along with its
state representative, Nicholas Micozzie (“Nicholas”), and Thomas Micozzie (“Thomas”),
who currently serves as its Mayor, repeatedly “demanded that DB perform [offsite] work
on the Upper Darby side of Bishop Avenue.”  (App. at 9.)  According to DB’s president,
Davoud Baravordeh, Nicholas promised “state funding and/or materials for purposes of
this construction,” but also warned that unless Baravordeh agreed to carry out these
demands, Nicholas would use his “political power to shut down work on the entire
Springfield Knoll project.”  (Id. at 10.)  Nicholas explained that the construction work
“was important to Thomas Micozzie’s upcoming election bid for Upper Darby Township
Council.”  (Id.)  
DB spent $180,000 in construction work related to sewers along Bishop Avenue in
Upper Darby, and was not reimbursed for its work.  Nicholas and Thomas also demanded
       This turn of events was surprising to DB because a PennDOT official had visited2
Springfield Knoll each work day from July through October, always approving of DB’s
progress.
-3-
that unless DB perform work on the sidewalks and curbs along Bishop Avenue without
reimbursement, they would “shut down” work on Springfield Knoll.  (Id. at 11.)  On
October 22, 2007, the same day that Nicholas scheduled a meeting that Baravordeh failed
to attend, three Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) “officials
arrived “at the Springfield Knoll construction site and . . . abruptly commanded Mr.
Baravordeh to stop work on the project on several pretexts” and “trivial excuse[s].”   (Id.2
at 12.)  Later that week, PennDOT officials demanded that unless DB replaced all curbs
and sidewalks on the Upper Darby side of Bishop Avenue at no cost, the Springfield
Knoll project would be shut down “permanently.”  (Id.)  DB reluctantly agreed to comply,
but the complaint does not allege that DB, in fact, performed any work on those curbs and
sidewalks.  DB claims that PennDOT officials – at the behest of the Micozzies – continue
to harass and pressure it to complete free work for Upper Darby.  
DB filed a two-count amended complaint in the District Court naming as
defendants both Thomas and Nicholas, in their individual capacities, and Upper Darby
Township.  In Count 1, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DB  alleged that defendants
violated its 14th Amendment due process rights by engaging in “arbitrary and outrageous
government interference” with its business by “forcing” it to perform work outside of
Springfield Knoll without payment.  (Id. at 13-14.)  DB sought as damages the costs of
       The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have3
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
       This appeal does not concern Count 2 of the Complaint, and DB does not challenge4
the District Court’s ruling granting Upper Darby’s motion to dismiss Count 1.
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performing work for Upper Darby, which the complaint quantifies as approximately
$180,000 in sewer construction.  In Count 2, DB claimed unjust enrichment under state
law.  
On June 18, 2009, the District Court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.  As
to Count 1, it granted Upper Darby’s unopposed motion, and granted Thomas’ motion
after finding no connection between Thomas and the sewer construction, which was “the
only unlawfully coerced work DB alleges it has done.”  (Id. at 24.)  The Court also found
that Nicholas’s threats to use his political influence to derail the Springfield Knoll project
did not shock the conscience such that they violated DB’s constitutional rights.  It
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count 2.  DB timely appealed.  
DISCUSSION3
DB argues that both Nicholas and Thomas Micozzie violated its substantive due
process rights by forcing it to choose between performing $180,000 in sewer construction
or having its development at Springfield Knoll disrupted.   Our review of the District4
Court’s order granting the motions to dismiss is plenary.  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198,
205 (3d Cir. 2008).  To survive a motion to dismiss, DB must “allege facts that raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the
       As the District Court noted, DB’s complaint fails to allege any facts connecting5
Thomas to Nicholas’s demand that DB perform sewer work.  Nor does the complaint
allege any facts in support of DB’s assertion to us that “since Thomas was present when
Nicholas made some of these threats, it is fair to allege that Thomas and Nicholas
conspired to violate DB’s rights through extortion.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 8-9.)  Absent
sufficient factual allegations of a conspiracy, we are “not required to accept legal
conclusions alleged in the complaint.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir.
2010).  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting Thomas’s motion to dismiss
Count 1.  
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complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234
(3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular
interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and the government’s
deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.”  Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d
200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington,
316 F.3d 392, 400-02 (3d Cir. 2003)).  We have previously held that “real property
ownership” is an interest entitled to substantive due process protection,  Nicholas v. Pa.
State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 2000), where the government conduct is “so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience,” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2006).
DB’s complaint alleges that defendants, through articulated threats and unfulfilled
promises, forced it to perform sewer construction in exchange for the right to develop
Springfield Knoll without interruption.   DB had a property interest in Springfield Knoll5
worthy of substantive due process protection.  That having been said, however, and as
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shameful as Nicholas’s alleged conduct is – allegations we are required to accept as true –
DB has failed to state a substantive due process claim.  First, DB does not allege that
Nicholas’s coercion with reference to the sewer construction interrupted its operations at
Springfield Knoll.  The complaint alleges that on October 22, 2007, “PennDot officials
appeared at the Springfield Knoll construction site and, without any legal basis, abruptly
commanded Mr. Baravordeh to stop work on the project on several pretexts,” but
PennDOT is not a defendant here.  (App. at 12.)  Even had PennDOT been acting “in
concert with and/or at the direction of” Nicholas, its actions on October 22 concerned the
demand – conveyed shortly thereafter at a meeting on October 24 – that DB replace curbs
and sidewalks.  (Id. at 11-12.)  Accordingly, DB has not set out a factual basis for the
claim that it was denied the use and enjoyment of its property as a result of the sewer-
related coercion.    
Even assuming that Nicholas’s threats did interfere with DB’s use and enjoyment
of its property, such “[d]eprivation violates due process only when it ‘shocks the
conscience,’” an extremely difficult standard to meet.  See Chainey, 523 F.3d at 219
(quoting United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400) (quotations omitted).  In Eichenlaub v.
Township of Indiana, we found that the township’s efforts in selectively enforcing zoning
laws, pursuing unannounced and unnecessary inspections, and improperly increasing tax
assessments were not such that they shocked the conscience, particularly because there
were no allegations that the defendants were motivated by corruption, self-dealing, or bias
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against a particular ethnic group.  385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).  Nicholas’s conduct
here is comparable to the conduct that we found to be less than conscience-shocking in
Eichenlaub.  To the extent that DB claims that the case before us “clearly involves
corruption and self-dealing,” its complaint does little to support such a contention. 
(Appellant’s Br. at 12.)  Indeed, there is no allegation that Nicholas had a financial or
ownership interest in Bishop Avenue’s sewers or their environs, and the only benefit to
Nicholas that DB alleges is that Thomas’s political ambitions would be furthered by the
improvement of those sewers and their environs.  
DB attempts to distinguish its case from those cited by the District Court in
support of the Court’s holding that Nicholas’s threats do not shock the conscience.  We
note just one.  In Corales v. Bennett, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
a school official’s threats to students that they would face fines and juvenile hall
sentences were not threats “egregious enough to shock the conscience.”  567 F.3d 554,
568 (9th Cir. 2009).  DB claims that in Corales, “the students were threatened and
nothing more, while DB was threatened and forced to perform $180,000 of work on the
basis of the threat.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.)  Nicholas’s threats, however, were no
more egregious than those in Corales, and at no point was DB stopped from developing
Springfield Knoll as a result of the threat concerning sewer construction.  We conclude,
therefore, that Nicholas’s coercion of DB to perform services to benefit Upper Darby’s
sewer system and his false promise of reimbursement with state funds are not such that
       Given this disposition, we need not address the issue of sovereign immunity.  6
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they shock the conscience.  
Having found that DB was not restricted in its use and development of Springfield
Knoll as a result of Nicholas’s sewer-related threats and false promises, and that those
threats and promises were not such that they shock the conscience, we conclude that the
District Court appropriately granted the motions to dismiss.      6
CONCLUSION
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
